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In 2003, California enacted the Private Attorneys General Act 
(“PAGA”) in response to its inability to enforce its labor code amid 
rapid expansion of its workforce.  What was traditionally a responsibil-
ity of the Attorney General, private plaintiffs could now sue their em-
ployers for alleged violations of the labor code.  The law was received 
with much controversy, and to this day, there are growing concerns that 
it has become an extortive mechanism for plaintiffs at the expense of the 
business community.   
This Note traces the historical development of the law by investi-
gating its expansion in both the legislature and judiciary.  Further, this 
Note uses CABIA v. Xavier Becerra, a case that alleges PAGA is uncon-
stitutional both under state and federal law, as a framework by which to 
consider and analyze the law’s future.  This Note proposes that there is 
a need for greater judicial oversight in PAGA lawsuits—particularly so 
in the settlement phase, where oftentimes plaintiff’s attorneys use PAGA 
claims as a tool to leverage large settlements.  The current statutory re-
quirement of court approval of PAGA settlements is insufficient and in 
need of greater scrutiny if California is to fulfill the legislative purpose 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the California Legislature enacted the Private Attorneys 
General Act (“PAGA”), in response to the concern that the Labor and 
Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) was not properly enforc-
ing the state labor code.1  The legislature believed the LWDA was re-
stricted by budgetary constraints, low-staffing levels, and a growing 
workforce.2  To overcome these restrictions, the legislature deputized 
aggrieved employees to allow them to bring actions on behalf of the 
state.3  Through PAGA, California effectively authorized aggrieved em-
ployees to act as private attorney generals to sue their employers to en-
force the labor code.4  A PAGA action is a quasi-qui tam5 action provid-
ing the state with 75% of the proceeds and 25% to the aggrieved 
employee.6   
From its initial enactment to present-day construction, PAGA law-
suits have grown at an exponential rate.  During the first year when the 
law took effect, fiscal year 2004-2005, the state collected $20,900 in 
PAGA penalties.7  By fiscal year 2017-2018 that number rose to 
$34,640,059.8   
Courts have consistently eroded employers’ ability to defend 
against PAGA litigation.9  The California judiciary has expanded the 
law’s scope through decisions such as Arias v. Superior Court,10 Is-
kanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC,11 and Huff v. Securitas 
Security Services USA, Inc.12  Arias removes the class action requirement 
 
 1. Matthew J. Goodman, The Private Attorney General Act: How to Manage the Un-
manageable, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 413, 417-18 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 418. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a qui tam 
action as “[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, 
part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive”). 
 6. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 418. 
 7. E-mail from the “DIR PAGAInfo,” to author (Jan. 15, 2019, 08:53 PST) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter 2019 DIR PAGAInfo Email]; see also infra Figure 1. This chart was pro-
vided by the California Department of Industrial Relations. For more information, contact 
PAGAinfo@dir.ca.gov. 
 8. See infra Figure 1. 
 9. But see ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 198 (2019) (holding that a PAGA 
plaintiff is eligible to recover only a fixed penalty amount per pay period and does not include 
an unpaid wage claim under the California Labor Code section 558). 
 10. 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009). 
 11. 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014). 
 12. 23 Cal. App. 5th 745 (2018), reh’g denied (June 13, 2018), review denied (Aug. 8, 
2018); see also Kim v. Reins Int’l California, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73 (2020) (holding that an em-
ployee does not lose standing to pursue a PAGA claim after settling individual claims). 
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for PAGA.13  Iskanian precludes a PAGA representative action from be-
ing waived by a pre-employment agreement.14  Huff establishes that an 
employee aggrieved of at least one labor code violation may pursue any 
and all labor code violations committed by the employer, regardless of 
whether those additional violations harmed the plaintiff-employee.15   
On November 28, 2018, however, the California Business & Indus-
trial Alliance (“CABIA”), an organization advocating on behalf of the 
California business community, sued California Attorney General, Xa-
vier Becerra, challenging PAGA’s constitutionality.16  The case was in 
litigation at the time of writing this Note.17   
CABIA received its first win in March 2019 when the court denied 
Attorney General Xavier Becerra’s attempt to dismiss the case.18  In Sep-
tember 2019, however, the court ruled against CABIA, by narrowing the 
scope of the lawsuit, finding that CABIA failed to show how PAGA vi-
olates the separation of powers doctrine and due process rights.19  In re-
jecting CABIA’s separation of powers claim, the court ruled it is bound 
by the ruling in Iskanian, which held that PAGA does not violate sepa-
ration of powers laws in the California Constitution.20  It is uncertain 
how CABIA’s judicial challenge to PAGA’s constitutionality will con-
tinue unfolding, but a challenging course lies ahead for the organiza-
tion.21   
This Note will first provide a historical account of the difficulties 
the state faced in enforcing the labor code prior to PAGA.  The Note will 
 
 13. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 975. 
 14. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383; see also Correia v. NB Baker Elec., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 
5th 602, 624-25 (2019) (holding that employers may not compel arbitration of PAGA claims 
through arbitration agreements without the state’s consent). 
 15. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 751 (2018). 
 16. See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Cal. Bus. & In-
dus. All. v. Becerra, No. 30-2018-01035180-CV-JR-CXC (Orange Cty. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 
2018) [hereinafter CABIA Complaint]. 
 17. See generally Docket, Cal. Bus. & Indus. All., No. 30-2018-01035180-CV-JR-CXC. 
 18. Bianca Bruno, Business Trade Group Wins First Battle Against California Labor 
Law, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/busi-
ness-trade-group-wins-first-battle-against-california-labor-law/. 
 19. Martin Macias Jr., Judge Narrows Scope of California Labor Law Challenge, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-nar-
rows-scope-of-california-labor-law-challenge/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See generally Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Cal. Bus. & Indus. All., No. 30-2018-01035180-CV-JR-CXC (on November 21, 2019, Attor-
ney General Xavier Becerra filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. At the time this Note was 
written, the motion was pending before the court. Defendants argue the claims under the 
United States Constitution and California Constitution are without merit because the claims 
are governed by a rational basis standard of review and PAGA is rationally related to a legit-
imate state purpose); Summary Adjudication, Cal. Bus. & Indus. All., No. 30-2018-01035180-
CV-JR-CXC. 
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trace PAGA’s initial implementation and subsequent expansion through 
the California Legislature, through its present-day reality.  It will high-
light how the amendments were necessary because the law was unsuc-
cessful in achieving the purpose that led to its initial enactment.  In a 
parallel fashion, the Note will examine PAGA in the judiciary through 
analysis of key decisions and more recent rulings.  It will use the CABIA 
litigation as a framework by which to analyze the future of the law and 
will propose three solutions to deal with PAGA’s inability to achieve the 
legislative purpose that led to its enactment.   
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PAGA 
A. California’s Labor Code Enforcement Problem Prior to PAGA 
The California State Assembly Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment held hearings in 2001 regarding the state’s effectiveness and effi-
ciency of enforcing its wage and hour laws.22  At the time of the hearings, 
the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”)  consisted of a staff of 
over 460 workers, making it the largest state labor law enforcement or-
ganization in the country.23  The Committee reported that in fiscal year 
2001-2002, the Legislature appropriated over $42 million to the Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”)—a sub-agency of the DIR.24  
However, despite its size and funding, the committee found that the DIR 
was not effectively holding employers accountable for labor law viola-
tions.25   
The Los Angeles garment industry exemplifies the failure of the 
DIR.  A U.S. Department of Labor Study of the garment industry in Los 
Angeles, which employed more than 100,000 workers, estimated over 
33,000 ongoing wage violations.26  The DIR, however, was issuing 
fewer than 100 wage citations per year, for all industries throughout the 
state.27   
The DIR’s failure to fully enforce labor laws implicated a loss of 
income generating tax money that would be paid to the state.28  For ex-
ample, the DIR failed to enforce labor laws in California’s “underground 
economy”—businesses operating outside the state’s tax and licensing re-
quirements— that estimates to gross from $60 billion to $140 billion a 
 
 22. Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment: Hearing on S.B. 796, 2003-04 Reg. 
Sess., 3 (Cal. July 9, 2003) [hereinafter ACLE SB 796 Hearing].   
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. ACLE SB 796 Hearing, supra note 22, at 3. 
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year.29  Annually, this meant California’s underground economy un-
derreported, or failed to report altogether, income-generating activity, 
causing the state to lose out on $3 billion to $6 billion of taxable money 
because the DIR failed to enforce labor laws.30   
Prior to PAGA, the resources of enforcement agencies were dispro-
portionate to the market they were to police.  Collectively, California’s 
enforcement agencies were responsible for protecting the legal rights of 
over seventeen million workers and regulating almost 800,000 private 
establishments—in addition to the public sector workplace.31  Between 
1980 and 2000, California’s workforce grew 48%; however, at that same 
time, resources available to the labor enforcement divisions remained 
below levels available in the mid-1980s.32  During this twenty-year 
timespan, the DLSE’s budgetary resources increased only 27%.33   
In addition to low staffing and resource levels, another issue with 
enforcing the labor code was that many violations were punishable only 
as criminal misdemeanors with no civil penalties available.34  Due to the 
lack of resources, district attorneys naturally directed their time to vio-
lent crimes and other public priorities.35  As a result, labor code viola-
tions rarely resulted in criminal investigations and prosecutions, mean-
ing employers were seldomly held accountable for violating the labor 
code.36   
Conflicted by low staffing levels, budgetary constraints, and an in-
creasing labor force, the California Legislature proposed what it per-
ceived to be a solution—Senate Bill 796 (“SB 796”).37  Referred to as 
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), SB 796 
sought to expand assessing and collecting civil penalties for labor code 
violations, which under existing law, was only enforceable by the 
LWDA.38   
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 3-4. 
 33. Id. at 4. 
 34. ACLE SB 796 Hearing, supra note 22, at 4. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Assembly Committee on Appropriations: Hearing on S.B. 796, 2003-04 Reg. Sess., 
2 (Cal. Aug. 20, 2003). 
 38. See An act to add Part 13 (commencing with Section 2698) to Division 2 of the Labor 
Code, relating to employment, S.B. 796 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2003-04 Sess., 1 (Cal. Feb. 
21, 2003), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=200320040SB796 [hereinafter Legislative Counsel’s Digest]. 
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B. PAGA: From Bill to Enactment 
The proposed PAGA bill would allow aggrieved employees to 
bring civil actions that financially penalize employers for violations of 
the labor code if the LWDA itself chose not investigate.39  The purpose 
of PAGA was not to benefit aggrieved employees by recovering dam-
ages or obtaining restitution, but rather to create a means of “deputizing” 
citizens as private attorneys general to enforce the labor code.40  Accord-
ingly, the statute is designed for the benefit of the general public, not the 
aggrieved employee.41   
Penalties collected in these actions would typically be distributed 
50% to the General Fund, 25% to the LWDA for education, and 25% to 
the aggrieved employee.42  The Labor and Workforce Development 
Fund would receive the LWDA portion from a PAGA case to be used 
for enforcement of labor laws, as well as to provide education to em-
ployers and employees about their rights and responsibilities under the 
labor code.43  In addition, an aggrieved employee could recover reason-
able attorney’s fees and costs—and if applicable—penalties.44   
The California State Assembly passed the PAGA bill on September 
11, 2003, by a margin of one vote above the minimum required to pass 
a regular bill.45  Similarly, the California State Senate passed the PAGA 
bill by the minimum number of votes necessary for a regular bill—
twenty-one.46  Governor Gray Davis signed the PAGA bill on October 
12, 2003, five days after the California electorate voted to recall him 
from office.47  The bill took effect on January 1, 2004.48   
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 753; Ben Nicholson, Businesses Beware: Chapter 906 Dep-
utizes 17 Million Private Attorneys General to Enforce the Labor Code, MCGEORGE L. REV. 
581, 584 (2004) (citing Letter from Tom Rankin, President, California Labor Federation, to 
Assembly member Ellen Corbet, Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 25, 
2003) (on file with McGeorge Law Review). 
 41. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 753. 
 42. Legislative Counsel’s Digest, supra note 38, at 1. 
 43. The 2016-17 Budget: Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act Resources, LEGIS. 
ANALYST’S OFF. (Mar. 25, 2016), https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3403. 
 44. Legislative Counsel’s Digest, supra note 38, at 1. 
 45. CABIA Complaint, supra note 16, at 17. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Anthony J. Oncidi & Robert A. Escalante, California Private Attorneys General Act 
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C. Support/Opposition to PAGA 
Proponents of the bill included the California Labor Federation, the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“AFL-CIO”), and the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation 
(“CRLAF”).49  Proponents noted the bill would address inadequacies in 
labor law enforcement and would generate revenue by assigning nomi-
nal civil penalties to provisions of the labor code.50  The proponents fur-
ther argued that inadequate staffing levels and the continued growth of 
California’s labor force warranted creative solutions that would help the 
state crack down on labor law violators.51  PAGA proposed to deputize 
California’s workforce to allow aggrieved employees to recover civil 
penalties for employer violations of the labor code.52   
Critics, however, argued the bill’s detrimental impact on California 
employers outweighed the benefit to employees.53  Employer groups, 
such as the California Chamber of Commerce, argued it was unfair that 
employees were entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if they prevailed in 
their action, yet similar attorney’s fees and costs were not available for 
prevailing employers.54  Further, critics argued the bill would “encour-
age private attorneys to ‘act as vigilantes’ [in] pursuing frivolous viola-
tions on behalf of different employees.”55  Finally, critics expressed frus-
tration that there were no requirements—such as a preliminary claim 
filing with the Labor Commissioner—for employees to satisfy prior to 
pursuing a PAGA claim.56   
D. Repeal Efforts and Amendments 
Opponents worked to repeal PAGA as soon as it was enacted.57  
These efforts, however, were unsuccessful.58  Instead, just months after 
PAGA’s enactment, the first iteration of PAGA was significantly 
amended by Senate Bill 1809 (“SB 1809”),59 followed by Assembly Bill 
 
 49. See ACLE SB 796 Hearing, supra note 22, at 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 5. 
 52. See Legislative Counsel’s Digest, supra note 38, at 2. 
 53. See ACLE SB 796 Hearing, supra note 22, at 5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Chris Micheli, Private Attorneys General Act Lawsuits in California: A Review 
of PAGA and Proposals for Reforming the “Sue Your Boss” Law, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 265, 
268 (2017). 
 58. See id. 
 59. An act to amend Sections 98.6 and 2699 of, to add Sections 2699.3 and 2699.5 to, 
and to repeal Section 431 of the Labor Code, relating to private employment, making an ap-
propriation therefore, and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect immediately, S.B. 1809 
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1506 (“AB 1506”),60 Senate Bill 836 (“SB 836”),61 and Assembly Bill 
1654 (“AB 1654”).62   
1. Senate Bill 1809 (SB 1809) 
Senator Joseph Dunn introduced SB 1809 as an urgency statute, and 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law on August 11, 
2004.63  The statute’s amendment provisions retroactively applied to 
cases filed after January 1, 2004, to provide relief to employers who may 
have been adversely affected by frivolous PAGA lawsuits.64  SB 1809 
established that as a precondition to bringing a civil action under PAGA, 
an aggrieved employee would have to comply with specified procedural 
and administrative requirements, including giving written notice to the 
LWDA and the employer.65  Further, for any PAGA action, SB 1809 
afforded courts a new ability to award less than the maximum civil pen-
alty amount specified by the underlying applicable statute.66  This 
amended provision, by allowing judicial discretion of penalty assess-
ment, reduced the probability that insignificant or inadvertent violations 
could lead to astronomical penalties.67  Additionally, SB 1809 required 
courts to review and authorize any settlement agreement.68   
In addition to the procedural and administrative requirements, SB 
1809 eliminated employee recovery based on an employer’s violation of 
 
– Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2003-04 Sess. (Cal. Aug. 11, 2004), https://leginfo.legisla-
ture.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200320040SB1809. 
 60. An act to amend Sections 2699, 2699.3, and 2699.5 of the Labor Code, relating to 
employment, and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect immediately, Assemb. B. 1506 
– Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2003-04 Sess. (Cal. Oct. 2, 2015), https://leginfo.legisla-
ture.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1506. 
 61. An act relating to the Budget Act of 2016, S.B. 836 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2015-
16 Sess., at subdiv. 26 (Cal. June 27, 2016), https://leginfo.legisla-
ture.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB836; see also Private Attorneys 
General Act (PAGA), LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV. AGENCY, https://www.labor.ca.gov/re-
sources/paga/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 62. An act to add and repeal Section 2699.6 of the Labor Code, relating to employment, 
Assemb. B. 1654 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2017-18 Sess. (Cal. Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1654; see 
also CABIA Complaint, supra note 16, at 17-18. 
 63. Leonora M. Schloss & Cari A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor Code Private 
Attorneys General Act, 28 L.A. LAW. 13, 14 (Feb. 2006). 
 64. See An act to amend Section 1194.2 of the Labor Code, relating to employees, S.B. 
1809 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2003-04 Sess., §§ 6, 10 (Cal. Feb. 20, 2004), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200320040SB1809. 
 65. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
 66. Id. § 3(e)(2). 
 67. See Micheli, supra note 57, at 269 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (amended by 
Chapter 221)) (explaining that SB 1809 “authorizes courts to award a lesser amount if ‘to do 
otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory’ ” ). 
 68. Cal. S.B. 1809 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest §§ 3(l), 4(b)(4). 
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most posting or notice requirements of the labor code.69  Instead, an ac-
tion for a violation of a posting or notice requirement would be allowed 
only if it related to an employer’s failure to communicate information 
regarding mandatory payroll or workplace injuries.70  This change sig-
nificantly decreased an employer’s liability, as causes of action based on 
notice posting requirements were dismissed and could no longer be 
raised.71   
2. Recent reforms—Assembly Bill 1506 (AB 1506) and Senate Bill 
836 (SB 836) 
SB 1809 provided the PAGA framework for many years.  However, 
in 2015, Governor Jerry Brown amended several PAGA provisions 
through AB 1506.72  AB 1506 removed an employer’s failure to include 
the period of performance and employer’s name and address in the wage 
statement from PAGA’s enumerated list of serious violations.73  Further, 
the amendment required aggrieved employees to provide notice of the 
alleged violation and provided employers a period to cure the violation.74   
Proponents, noting PAGA lawsuits increased over 400% between 
2005 and 2013, argued the bill would help curb frivolous litigation with 
respect to Cal. Lab. Code sections 226(a)(6) and 226(a)(8) by granting 
an employer thirty-three days to cure an alleged violation.75  If the em-
ployer failed to cure the violation, the employee would be able to file a 
civil action and obtain any unpaid wages, penalties, and attorney’s fees.76  
Proponents argued AB 1506 would “provide the appropriate balance of 
allowing an employer to correct unintentional errors without the threat 
of a multi-million dollar lawsuit that could put the employer out of busi-
ness, while still protecting the employee’s ability to obtain accurate in-
formation.”77   
 
 69. Id. § 3(g)(2). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Micheli, supra note 57, at 269; see also Cal. S.B. 1809 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest 
§ 6(a). 
 72. Micheli, supra note 57, at 278; An act to amend Sections 2699, 2699.3, and 2699.5 
of the Labor Code, relating to employment, and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect 
immediately, Assemb. B. 1506 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2003-04 Sess. (Cal. Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1506.   
 73. See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, Assemb. B. 1506, 2015-16 Sess., 
at 1 (Sept. 2, 2015). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 3; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 226(a)(6) (West 2019) (requiring the inclusive 
dates of the pay period) and § 226(a)(8) (addressing an employer’s legal name and address). 
 76. STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, Assemb. B. 1506, 2015-16 Sess., at 3 
(Sept. 2, 2015). 
 77. Id. 
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In 2016, Governor Jerry Brown sought further reform of PAGA 
through SB 836, which would shift the handling of cases from courts to 
agencies.  Governor Brown’s 2016 budget proposal highlighted the high 
volume of PAGA cases and noted that less than 1% of cases were being 
reviewed or investigated due to a lack of resources.78  SB 836 declared 
that the intent of the legislature was for the LWDA to continue to assign 
duties prescribed by PAGA to the respective departments and agencies 
where those duties were customarily performed.79  In a statement regard-
ing the proposed legislation, Governor Jerry Brown recognized the liti-
gious nature of PAGA filings: “[t]he administration is committed to re-
ducing unnecessary litigation and lowering the costs of doing business 
in California to support a thriving economic environment.  Given the 
scope and frequency of PAGA filings, there is great opportunity to in-
crease the rate of administrative handling of cases versus the courts.”80   
SB 836 implemented procedural reforms and limitations.  The bill 
mandated online PAGA filings and transmission of all items submitted 
to the LWDA, as well as a $75 filing fee for new case notices.81  More 
importantly, the modification extended the LWDA’s investigative pe-
riod of new cases from thirty to sixty days.82  The LWDA would also 
have sixty-five days to notify the parties to an action of its intent to in-
vestigate a violation, as opposed to the previous thirty-three days.83  As 
a result, SB 836 prohibited plaintiffs from commencing a PAGA action 
until sixty-five days after sending notice to the LWDA.84  The agency 
could also extend the time to complete an investigation by sixty days, 
 
 78. STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., BUDGET CHANGE PROPOSAL, Private Attorneys Gen-
eral Act (PAGA), 2016/17 Fiscal Year, at 1 n.1 (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://web1a.esd.dof.ca.gov/Documents/bcp/1617/FY1617_ORG7350_BCP474.pdf [herein-
after Brown 2016/17 Budget Proposal]; see also David B. Smith, What Can Brown Do for 
PAGA? Budget Proposal Seeks Greater Oversight of PAGA Claims, ORRICK BLOGS—EMP. 
L. & LITIG. (Jan. 26, 2016), https://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2016/01/26/what-can-
brown-do-for-paga-budget-proposal-seeks-greater-oversight-of-paga-claims/; Micheli, supra 
note 57, at 277. 
 79. An act relating to the Budget Act of 2016, S.B. 836 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2015-
16 Sess., § 188 (Cal. June 27, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB836. 
 80. Brown 2016/17 Budget Proposal, supra note 78, at 3 (Analysis of the Problem: State 
Level Considerations); see also Tim L. Johnson, California PAGA Amendments Will Expand 
Labor Officials’ Involvement in PAGA Claims, OGLETREE DEAKINS (June 23, 2016), 
https://ogletree.com/insights/2016-06-23/california-paga-amendments-will-expand-labor-of-
ficials-involvement-in-paga-claims/. 
 81. See Micheli, supra note 57, at 277. 
 82. Id. at 278. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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with notice, when necessary.85  Moreover, if applicable, PAGA cure no-
tices for employers were now filed online with the LWDA.86  Upon a 
case’s conclusion, SB 836 requires employees to submit a copy of a pro-
posed settlement to the LWDA, at the same time it is filed for court ap-
proval.87   
3. Assembly Bill 1654 (AB 1654): Construction Industry Exempted 
from PAGA 
The most recent modification to PAGA came in 2018, under AB 
1654.88  Construction workers are now exempt from PAGA if they are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement that expressly provides 
for—among other things—a grievance and binding arbitration procedure 
to redress violations that would have been remedied under PAGA.89  
However, for this exemption to apply, the collective bargaining agree-
ment must waive the requirements of PAGA in clear and unambiguous 
terms, and it must authorize an arbitrator to award all remedies available 
under PAGA, except any awards or penalties that would be payable to 
the LWDA.90   
III. PAGA’S EXPANSION THROUGH THE JUDICIARY 
Despite legislative efforts, California courts continue to expand 
PAGA’s reach.   
A. An Aggrieved Employee Does Not Have to Satisfy Class Action 
Requirements as PAGA Is a “Representative Action” Raised as a Law 
Enforcement Mechanism (Arias v. Superior Court) 
In Arias v. Superior Court, the plaintiff alleged under PAGA that 
defendant employer violated the labor code by failing to provide 
 
 85. Id. Currently, this sixty day extension portion of the bill has a running effect until 
July 1, 2021, but the Legislature could extend it further. Id.; see also An act relating to the 
Budget Act of 2016, S.B. 836 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2015-16 Sess., at 12 (Cal. June 27, 
2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB836. 
 86. See Micheli, supra note 57, at 278. 
 87. Id. at 277. 
 88. LAB. § 2699.6; see also STATE OF CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON LABOR AND EMP’T, 
Assemb. B. 1654, 2017-18 Sess. at 1 (Aug. 31, 2018). 
 89. LAB. § 2699.6; see also An act to add and repeal Section 2699.6 of the Labor Code, 
relating to employment, Assemb. B. 1654 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2017-18 Sess., at 91 
(Cal. Sept. 19, 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1654. 
 90. An act to add and repeal Section 2699.6 of the Labor Code, relating to employment, 
Assemb. B. 1654 – Legis. Counsel’s Digest, 2017-18 Sess., at 91 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1654. 
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itemized wage statements and to maintain adequate payroll records, 
among other violations.91  Defendants argued—and the trial court 
agreed—that plaintiff had failed to comply with the pleading require-
ments for a class action as the law demanded.92  The Court of Appeals 
issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to issue a 
new order striking the representative claims because they were subject 
to class action requirements, which the plaintiffs failed to satisfy.93  On 
appeal to the California Supreme Court, defendants argued the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment would lead to absurd results if certain claims under 
Labor Code section 2699 would require plaintiffs satisfy class action re-
quirements, while others would not.94  Further, defendants argued that 
the Legislature intended for all actions raised under PAGA to be class 
actions.95  Otherwise, the act would be unconstitutional for violating the 
due process rights of employers, as well as nonparty aggrieved employ-
ees not provided an opportunity to join the action.96   
The court disagreed with the defendants.97  The court reasoned that 
because a PAGA action is designed to benefit the public through the 
deputized plaintiff, the one-way operation of collateral estoppel in this 
limited situation does not violate the employer’s right to due process of 
law.98  The potential impact on remedies other than civil penalties is an-
cillary to the action’s primary objective.99   
Arias expands PAGA’s scope by facilitating a plaintiff’s ability to 
raise a representative action, without satisfying the heightened standards 
typical to a class action.100  Additionally, Arias clarified that collateral 
estoppel could be used “only against non-named aggrieved employees 
with regard to civil penalties collected under PAGA, not the underlying 
[l]abor [c]ode violations.”101   
 
 91. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 976. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (“The trial court granted defendants’ motion to strike the seventh through eleventh 
causes of action . . . on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with pleading requirements 
for class actions.” Following plaintiff’s petition to the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, 
the court held “the causes of action brought in a representative capacity alleging violations of 
the unfair competition law, but not the representative claims under [PAGA], were subject to 
class action requirements.”). 
 94. Id. at 982. 
 95. Id. at 983-84. 
 96. Id. at 984. 
 97. See Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 988 (affirming the Court of Appeal’s judgment). 
 98. Id. at 987. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 424. 
 101. Jennifer Barrera, Private Attorneys General Act: Unique State Law Needs Reform to 
Prevent Abuse, Assure Enforcement Goals Met, CAL. CHAMBER OF COM.: LAB. & EMP. – 
2018 CAL. BUS. ISSUES, at 62 (Jan. 2018). 
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B. An Employee Cannot, Through a Pre-Employment Agreement, 
Waive the Right to Bring a PAGA Action, Because Such Agreements 
Violate Public Policy (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, 
LLC) 
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the court 
ruled that pre-employment arbitration agreements requiring employees 
to give up their right to a PAGA action are unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy.102  As part of his pre-employment agreement, the plaintiff 
entered into an arbitration agreement that waived his right to class and 
representative actions.103  Still, plaintiff sought to raise a representative 
action under PAGA for his employer’s alleged failure to compensate for 
overtime and meal and rest periods.104  The issue before the California 
Supreme Court was whether employers could, as a condition of employ-
ment, obligate employees to surrender their right to bring a representa-
tive PAGA action.105   
Relying on California Civil Code section 3513,106 the court made 
the distinction that anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended 
solely for their personal benefit, but no one can waive a law established 
for public benefit.107  In other words, a PAGA dispute is not between the 
employer and employee, but between an employer and the State of Cal-
ifornia.108  Further, the court emphasized that the legislature’s purpose 
in enacting PAGA was to enhance the limited enforcement capability of 
the LWDA by deputizing employees, and that a waiver to bring a PAGA 
action would disable this important law-enforcement mechanism.109  Re-
quiring an employee to waive their PAGA rights in a pre-employment 
agreement would essentially defeat the law’s purpose—the state would 
be unable to enforce the law as intended and collect civil penalties asso-
ciated with labor code violations.110   
The court noted that the aggrieved plaintiff raises a PAGA action, 
not solely through her own accord, but as a representative of the state.111  
Due to this, a PAGA waiver is unlike other pre-employment waivers 
 
 102. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 360. 
 103. Id. at 359. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 360. 
 106. Id. at 382-83 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West)) (“Any one may waive the ad-
vantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason 
cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”). 
 107. Id. at 382-83. 
 108. See Barrera, supra note 101. 
 109. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
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because the pre-employed plaintiff would essentially be giving up the 
option to act as a proxy for the state—which contravenes public pol-
icy.112   
C. An Employee May Seek Penalties for Labor Code Violations 
Without Suffering Harm (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.) 
Huff presented a unique question under PAGA litigation—whether 
an aggrieved employee who brings a claim for a labor code violation 
under PAGA may seek penalties for other labor code violations which 
did not affect him or her personally.113  The court held that in suffering 
from one labor code violation, an aggrieved employee could raise addi-
tional employer violations of the labor code, irrespective of whether the 
plaintiff suffered firsthand from the additional violations.114   
Plaintiff Forrest Huff worked as a security guard for defendant Se-
curitas Security Services USA, Inc., for one year, during which time he 
worked at three different client sites.115 Huff resigned after a client re-
quested he be removed from his assignment.116  He sued under PAGA, 
seeking penalties for labor code violations committed against himself 
and other employees.117   
The trial court granted judgment in favor of Securitas for claims 
where Huff was not personally aggrieved by the alleged violations.118  
However, the trial court later granted Huff’s motion for a new trial after 
finding that it erred.119  The trial court reasoned that while PAGA’s stat-
utory language requires an aggrieved employee to be personally affected 
by at least one labor code violation, the employee need not be personally 
affected by all additional labor code violations to pursue penalties on 
behalf of other aggrieved employees.120   
On appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeal, Securitas argued 
PAGA allows a plaintiff to recover for employer violations of the labor 
code that do not affect the individual bringing the suit only when the 
violations against the other employees involve the same provision of the 
labor code as that which allegedly harmed the plaintiff.121   
 
 112. See id. 
 113. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 750. 
 114. Id. at 750-51. 
 115. Id. at 751. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 751-52. 
 119. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 752. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 753-54. 
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In interpreting PAGA, the court looked to the legislature’s intent.122  
The court stated that Labor Code section 2699(a) provides merely that 
any provision of the labor code where a civil penalty could be assessed 
and collected by the LWDA may, as an alternative, be recovered by an 
aggrieved employee and on behalf of other employees.123  Further, the 
court noted that the statute specifically defines “aggrieved employee” in 
section 2699(c) as “any person who was employed by the alleged viola-
tor and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was commit-
ted.”124   
The court interpreted those provisions to plainly mean that a person 
who was employed by the alleged violator and affected by at least one 
of the violations alleged in the complaint can recover any labor code 
penalties recoverable by state authorities in a PAGA action.125  The court 
further reasoned that in enacting PAGA, the legislature intended to solve 
the problem of inadequate state enforcement resources by deputizing pri-
vate citizens to pursue labor code violators.126  It would make little sense, 
the court argued, to prevent a PAGA plaintiff—who is a proxy for state 
enforcement authorities—from seeking penalties for all violations an 
employer commits, as the goal is to achieve maximum compliance with 
state labor laws.127  Requiring that a plaintiff first be aggrieved by all 
asserted violations in a PAGA case does not flow logically from the fact 
that a plaintiff is standing in for government authorities to collect penal-
ties primarily paid to the state.128  Therefore, it would be against the leg-
islature’s intent to limit the plaintiff’s pursuit of penalties to only those 
labor code violations that affected the aggrieved employee personally.129   
The court noted the holding does not require a plaintiff to satisfy 
traditional standing requirements as Securitas argued.130  A PAGA action 
is a type of qui tam proceeding.131  Since the plaintiff is acting on behalf 
of the government, traditional standing requirements do not apply to qui 
tam actions.132  However, a PAGA suit is not a pure qui tam action, as 
only an aggrieved employee, and not the general public, can bring forth 
 
 122. Id. at 754. 
 123. Id. (citing CAL. LABOR CODE § 2699(a)). 
 124. Id. (citing CAL. LABOR CODE § 2699(c)). 
 125. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 754-56. 
 126. Id. at 756. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 757. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.   
 131. See Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 757 (comparing PAGA actions to more typical qui tam 
suits such as those brought under the False Claims Act). 
 132. Id. 
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an action.133  In this sense, standing requirements for PAGA are narrower 
than those for traditional qui tam actions, but broader than those for per-
sonal suits or even class actions.134  To further bolster its ruling, the court 
found it persuasive that two district courts congruently interpreted the 
PAGA statute to further empower the aggrieved employee.135   
1. Employer Liability Expands 
The Huff v. Securitas case expanded employer liability.  Now that 
employees are entitled to allege all labor code violations on behalf of 
themselves and fellow employees, businesses will likely experience in-
creased litigation costs to combat these PAGA cases.  While an ag-
grieved employee cannot assert baseless claims and must still present 
evidence that at least one personal violation occurred, critics argue that 
such an expansive interpretation of PAGA leaves the business commu-
nity vulnerable to aggrieved employees who now have an incentive to 
deliberately seek any instance of a labor code violation that might grant 
them a promising pay day.  Plaintiffs will have little to lose, as they will 
not be required to have personal knowledge of ongoing employer viola-
tions, and they can instead unearth them through discovery.136  The effect 
is particularly burdensome to the small business employer who may not 
have a human resources or compliance department that can advise on the 
complexities of labor code violations, particularly those that might im-
plicate a devastating financial loss.137   
Further, as employer liability expands, and compliance becomes 
more difficult, the court’s opinion may drive businesses from California 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. (PAGA standing requirements “strike[] a reasonable balance, requiring a 
plaintiff to have some connection to the employer’s unlawful practices, while also advancing 
the state’s interest in vigorous enforcement.”). 
 135. Id. at 758; see also Jeske v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. CV F 11-1838 LJO 
JLT, 2012 WL 78242, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] is correct that she need 
not have suffered all PAGA violations for which she seeks to pursue civil remedies.”); Holak 
v. K Mart Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00304-AWI-MSJ, 2015 WL 2384895, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 
2015) (“Plaintiff need not have actually suffered all of the Labor Code violations that she 
alleges to have taken place for purposes of seeking PAGA penalties.”). 
 136. See Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 761 (addressing the petitioner’s criticisms that the Huff 
ruling will lead to imaginative yet baseless pleadings, consequently overburdening courts with 
frivolous PAGA actions). 
 137. See George A. Aloupas, PAGA (Huff v. Securitas, (2018) 23 Cal. App. 5th 745), TLD 
LAW (Nov. 1, 2019) (explaining how Huff  “opens [e]mployers up to additional liability”), 
https://tldlaw.com/paga-huff-v-securitas-2018-23-cal-app-5th-745/; Bob Huff, PAGA Fixes 
Are Needed to Foster Growth, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Aug. 26, 2019) (explaining how 
PAGA’s penalty scheme especially hurts small businesses and why “[w]ithout a fix, PAGA 
lawsuits under California’s labor code will continue to be a significant barrier to starting a 
business . . . and unduly punishing many of those who do.”), https://www.ocregis-
ter.com/2019/08/26/paga-fixes-are-needed-to-foster-growth-bob-huff/. 
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to other states.  Local economies and California in general might suffer 
financially if businesses decide to outsource.  Local and state govern-
ment agencies will further bear the loss by being unable to collect taxes 
and other expenses that flow from a strong business community in Cali-
fornia.   
2. Huff’s Potential Impact is Perhaps Limited 
Despite these dire predictions, authors Wesley Shelton and Thomas 
Kaufman in Court Expands Reach of California PAGA Representative 
Actions, noted the practical effect of the Huff decision may be limited.138  
They highlight an employee is still required to provide the LWDA with 
written notice of the facts and circumstances relating to each alleged vi-
olation of the labor code before bringing a PAGA action.139  They argue 
this will be difficult to do if the allegations are speculative or ill-defined, 
and employers may attempt to limit the scope of discovery to prevent an 
extensive investigation into other potential areas of liability.140  If the 
employee submits a fact-free letter citing a long list of labor code viola-
tions, the vagueness of their allegations may provide a basis to challenge 
to the PAGA claim for failure to properly exhaust administrative reme-
dies with the required specificity.141  Additionally, employers can resort 
to a defense of manageability—a long list of labor code violations does 
not necessarily implicate that all allegations can be manageably tried 
through a single lawsuit.142  Although there is no statutory prerequisite 
mandating a PAGA claim to be manageable—that a case can be man-
aged fairly and efficiently143—some courts have embraced the defense, 
while others have not.144   
 
 138. Wesley Shelton & Thomas Kaufman, Court Expands Reach of California PAGA 
Representative Actions, SHEPPARD MULLIN: LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/06/articles/wage-and-hour/california-paga-
representative-actions-huff/. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn., 59 Cal. 4th 1, 28-29 (2014) (“In certifying 
a class action, the court must also conclude that litigation of individual issues . . . can be man-
aged fairly and efficiently.”). 
 144. Julia Wells & Tagore Subramaniam, PAGA: Forging Ahead, ADVOC. MAG. (Oct. 
2019), https://www.advocatemagazine.com/article/2019-october/paga-forging-ahead; see 
also Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 1117614, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2014 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ PAGA claims as unmanageable “because a mul-
titude of individualized assessments would be necessary”); Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
No. 09cv2063 MMA (NLS), 2012 WL 13724, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (denying without 
prejudice the plaintiff’s request to compel discovery because the discovery sought was unduly 
burdensome at the time). 
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In addition to Huff’s potential limitation, procedural mechanisms 
such as summary adjudication remain available to weed out meritless 
claims before trial.145  As a result, plaintiffs are disincentivized from 
pleading baseless claims to collect PAGA penalties because they must 
prove at trial that a violation in fact occurred.146   
Still, these procedural mechanisms require litigation, which is an 
added expense employers bear to defend against employees who have 
an incentive to sue under PAGA.  While the Huff court recognized Se-
curitas’s concern147 that plaintiffs may use PAGA claims “as a fishing 
expedition to attempt to uncover other violations committed by the em-
ployer,” the court noted those concerns are “better directed to the [l]eg-
islature.”148  Shelton and Kaufman echoed Securitas’s fears, noting “em-
ployers can now expect plaintiffs to attempt to use this case to justify 
sending a barrage of discovery demands, seeking essentially to conduct 
a complete audit of the organization’s compliance with state and wage 
hours laws.”149   
Unless, as the Huff court suggests, the legislature takes appropriate 
measures to address this plaintiff-friendly decision, it appears that em-
ployers will have to regard a potential PAGA lawsuit as part of the cost 
of doing business in California.   
IV. CABIA BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE V. XAVIER BECERRA 
The CABIA litigation is deeper than a superficial attack to the con-
stitutionality of the law—it symbolizes the frustration the California 
business community feels toward PAGA. 
A. CABIA files Complaint Alleging PAGA is Unconstitutional 
On November 28, 2018, CABIA sued California Attorney General, 
Xavier Becerra, for injunctive and declaratory relief in Orange County 
Superior Court.150  The complaint seeks a temporary restraining order 
and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the implementation 
 
 145. Huff, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 761. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Securitas was concerned that the court’s expansive interpretation of “aggrieved em-
ployee” would lead to absurd consequences as penalties collectable by PAGA plaintiffs would 
be bound solely by their pleading imagination.  The court stated “the trial courts are [] 
equipped to manage cases in a way that avoids unreasonable consumption of time or re-
sources.”  Further, the court added, “where appropriate cases brought under PAGA can be 
designated as complex under the Rules of Court.” Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Shelton & Kaufman, supra note 138. 
 150. See generally CABIA Complaint, supra note 16. 
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and enforcement of PAGA.151  The complaint also asks the court to issue 
a judgment declaring PAGA unconstitutional and unenforceable.152   
CABIA represents the interests of small and mid-sized businesses 
in California, some of which have been sued under PAGA.153  The asso-
ciation advocates for the California business community through public 
education, lobbying, and grassroots organizing.154  CABIA was formed 
for the specific purpose of accomplishing the repeal or reform of 
PAGA.155   
CABIA challenged the current PAGA framework as unconstitu-
tional, arguing: 
[V]alid and binding arbitration agreements are rendered unenforce-
able; private contingency-fee attorneys are permitted to litigate on 
behalf of the State without oversight or coordination with any State 
official; private attorneys are allowed to negotiate settlements that 
enrich themselves at the expense of everyone but themselves; due 
process protections embodied in class action procedural rules do not 
apply; trial courts are divested of discretion to manage certain dis-
covery issues; “fishing expeditions” are expressly authorized, allow-
ing discovery into claims and theories about which a litigant has no 
personal knowledge; [and] limited liability structures and/or a per-
son’s relationship to an employer is meaningless for the purposes of 
imposing liability for PAGA penalties.156 
B. Alleged Causes of Action—CABIA Asserts the PAGA Plaintiff 
Abuses Iskanian, and Often Serves Its Own Interest at the Expense of 
the State 
The CABIA complaint alleges that PAGA is unconstitutional under 
the following nine causes of action: 
(1)  violation of California’s Separation of Powers Doctrine; 
(2)  violation of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment Procedural Due Process Protections; 
(3)  violation of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment Substantive Due Process Protections; 
(4)  violation of California Constitutional Procedural Due Process 
Protections; 
(5)  violation of California Constitutional Substantive Due Process 
Protections; 
 
 151. Id. at 54. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See CABIA Complaint, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
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(6)  violation of the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
Excessive Fines and Unusual Punishment Protections; 
(7)  violation of California Constitution’s Excessive Fines and Unu-
sual Punishment Protections; 
(8)  violation of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection of the Laws Guarantee; 
(9)  violation of the California Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause.157 
Of the allegations raised, this Note specifically discusses the first 
cause of action “violation of California’s Separation of Powers Doc-
trine” and its relation to the Iskanian decision referenced above to ex-
plain exploitive settlement tactics PAGA plaintiffs frequently engage in.  
Although this cause of action was dismissed by the court,158 its discus-
sion is helpful in that it elucidates how PAGA plaintiffs often strategi-
cally stifle the state from larger settlement amounts.   
CABIA alleged a violation of California’s Separation of Powers 
Doctrine and made notable reference to the Iskanian decision. As indi-
cated above, the California Supreme Court in Iskanian determined that 
an express class action waiver in an employment arbitration agreement 
is unenforceable with respect to PAGA claims under California law.159  
As the cause of action explained, Iskanian is premised on the character-
ization of a PAGA as a qui tam proceeding and accordingly does not 
violate the separation of powers.160  The three traditional qui tam criteria 
are: (1) the statute exacts a penalty; (2) part of the penalty is paid to the 
informer; and (3) the informer is in some way authorized to bring suit to 
recover the penalty.161  Lastly, Iskanian found the government to be the 
real party in interest in the suit, despite the plaintiff receiving 25% of all 
penalties collected.162   
CABIA argued, however, that PAGA violates California’s Separa-
tion of Powers Doctrine because the statute “does not provide the judi-
ciary sufficient oversight of the judicial functions it has unconstitution-
ally delegated to private citizens and their counsel.”163  In addition, it 
asserted PAGA plaintiffs enjoy status similar to the Executive branch, 
 
 157. See id. at 41-54. 
 158. See generally Minute Order at 1, Cal. Bus. & Indus. All. v. Becerra, No. 30-2018-
01035180-CV-JR-CXC (Orange Cty. Super. Ct., Sept. 11, 2019). 
 159. Id. at 24-25. 
 160. See CABIA Complaint, supra note 16, at 25 (citing Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los 
Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382 (2014)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 42. 
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without the requisite oversight to ensure plaintiffs advocate on behalf of 
the state’s interests.164   
CABIA emphasized the private contingency-fee attorneys who file 
and pursue PAGA claims make no effort to further the interests of the 
state in litigation, and in fact, often work against the interests of the state 
in private mediation.165  In practice, CABIA asserts, private-contingency 
fee-attorneys exploit the holding of Iskanian to pressure employers with 
binding arbitration agreements to participate in private mediation.166  
Once in mediation the parties rarely afford PAGA penalties any serious 
consideration.167  Instead, “the parties usually arrive at a sum that will 
resolve the underlying statutory claims on a class-wide basis.”168  The 
private contingency-fee attorney has an interest in recommending only a 
small portion of the total to PAGA to maximize attorney’s fees.169  
CABIA contends: 
[A] lack of oversight by the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the California State government . . . has allowed PAGA 
to become a tool of extortion and abuse by the Plaintiffs’ Bar, who 
exploit the special standing of their PAGA plaintiff clients to avoid 
arbitration, threaten business-crushing lawsuits, and extract billions 
of dollars in settlements.170 
In other words, according to CABIA although the state should tech-
nically receive 75% of all PAGA penalties assessed, it has received far 
less than it should.171  The PAGA plaintiff, through this procedural 
mechanism, deprives the state of funds it would otherwise be entitled to.   
In Private Attorneys General Act Lawsuits in California: A Review 
of PAGA and Proposals for Reforming the “Sue Your Boss” Law, Chris 
Micheli makes a similar argument.172  Micheli explains how the PAGA 
settlement process functions to deprive the state of a larger settlement 
amount, which exposes how PAGA plaintiffs are not acting in the state’s 
best interest.173  Due to this, PAGA has not fulfilled its promise of sup-
plementing funding for the Labor Commissioner in the way its propo-
nents intended prior to the law’s enactment.174   
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Similar to the argument made in the CABIA litigation, Micheli ar-
gues that PAGA claims are often released through a broader settlement 
that includes claims arising under other labor code violations.175  Typi-
cally in these instances, some of the total settlement goes towards the 
PAGA claims, but at a significantly reduced amount.176  This tactic casts 
doubt as to whether the PAGA plaintiff truly acts in the state’s best in-
terest.  The effect of this practice means little money makes its way to 
the state.177  By minimizing the allocation of the settlement to PAGA 
claims, the attorney pursuing his or her best interest has done so at the 
expense of the state, an outcome that is inconsistent with the quasi-qui 
tam framework upon which Iskanian rests.  Micheli argues PAGA 
claims should “remain intact and appropriately allocate the financial 
component to the state.”178  Otherwise, he asserts, California should pro-
hibit PAGA claims as a tool to exact large settlements from employ-
ers.179   
The CABIA complaint references certain examples that display 
what Micheli alludes to—the disproportionate amount of money the 
PAGA plaintiff receives at the expense of the state.180  The complaint 
notes that in Viceral v. Mistras Group, the parties finalized a $6,000,000 
settlement total that allocated only $20,000 to the PAGA claim, even 
though the settlement was originally valued at $12,900,000.181  The 
plaintiffs’ attorneys obtained $2,000,000 in fees and $46,000 in costs.182  
Another example mentioned is Price v. Uber Technologies, Inc., in 
which parties agreed to a $7,750,000 settlement for a case originally es-
timating liability at over $1,000,000,000.183 The plaintiff’s attorneys ob-
tained $2,325,000, while the average Uber driver was awarded slightly 
over one dollar ($1.08).184  And John Doe v. Google Inc., arrived at a 
$1,000,000 settlement, of which the attorneys received $330,000; mean-
while each aggrieved employee obtained just over fifteen dollars 
($15.50).185   
As CABIA argues, disproportionate settlement amounts such as 
these indicate that PAGA plaintiffs’ attorneys often enrich themselves at 
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the expense of the state.186  The gross imbalance in settlement amounts 
finalized in these lawsuits raise concerns regarding whether the PAGA 
plaintiff, in reality, acts on behalf of the state’s best interest.   
C. Looking Forward—Potential Outcomes 
This section explores the potential outcomes and implications that 
would likely follow after CABIA’s conclusion. 
1. If PAGA is Ruled Unconstitutional 
a. Memorandum Provides Discussion of Repercussions That 
Would Occur if PAGA Were to Disappear 
In a memorandum to California’s Attorney General, Xavier 
Becerra, dated November 27, 2017, the Legislative Analyst’s Office pro-
vided an analysis of the fiscal effects that would follow from a statutory 
initiative to repeal PAGA.187  Although observing the potential elimina-
tion of PAGA in a different context, the memorandum is relevant to this 
analysis in that it discusses the implications that would follow if PAGA 
were to disappear.188  The memorandum asserts a PAGA repeal would 
mean that in order to remedy labor law violations, employees could ei-
ther file wage claims with the Labor Commissioner’s Office or file tra-
ditional lawsuits against their employers in court.189   
Among the most notable fiscal effects, the memorandum indicates 
the state trial court costs could resultingly be reduced to the low tens of 
millions of dollars annually.190  Specifically, since employees would no 
longer be allowed to file PAGA lawsuits in trial courts, a PAGA repeal 
would reduce the workload of the state trial courts.191  This reduction 
would allow trial court resources to become available to focus on other 
types of cases.192   
Despite the reduction in court costs, a PAGA repeal would compro-
mise the state’s labor code enforcement capability.193  It would increase 
the number of wage claims filed with the Labor Commissioner, and the 
LWDA would likely encounter the same difficulties it had prior to 
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PAGA’s enactment; its resources would be strained and ability to timely 
adjudicate its caseload compromised.194  Interestingly, however, the 
memorandum also notes that “the Labor Commissioner’s Office would 
no longer need to review and investigate PAGA lawsuit notices, result-
ing in newly available staff resources that could be redirected to other 
priorities.”195   
Lastly, the memorandum predicts reduced state revenue from the 
elimination of PAGA penalties, which is perhaps the most notable ef-
fect.196  If PAGA penalties were no longer paid to the state, funds avail-
able for labor law enforcement would dwindle—potentially in the low 
tens of millions of dollars annually.197   
b. A Substantial Loss of State Income 
From California’s perspective, losing the enforcement mechanism 
existing in PAGA would be devastating.  California receives a substan-
tial sum in PAGA payments, and that figure continues growing expo-
nentially each fiscal year.198  In fiscal year 2014-2015, the state collected 
$8,402,507—a substantial increase from the $5,083,161 it collected in 
2013-2014.199  In subsequent years, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017, the state 
collected $13,588,659 and $20,946,544, respectively.200  In fiscal year 
2017-2018, the most recent figure available, the state collected 
$34,640,059.201  The difference in growth from fiscal years 2016-2017 
and 2017-2018 was nearly double in just one year.  This marks the larg-
est increase from one fiscal year to another since PAGA’s inception.  
These appreciable figures indicate the tremendous sums the state re-
ceives from PAGA litigation.  They also show that PAGA lawsuits have 
increased substantially in recent years, and that the law continues being 
a popular labor code enforcement mechanism far too lucrative to eradi-
cate.   
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Figure 1202 
 
If the state did not have PAGA, or if the law were eradicated by the 
CABIA litigation, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to collect the 
amount of money it currently collects from deputized plaintiffs.  The 
large financial benefits incentivize the California legislature to turn a 
blind eye to the difficulties pervading PAGA.  Further, the California 
legislature will almost certainly continue to defend or expand the law to 
maintain its financial benefits.  Alternatively, if critics push back on the 
law more fiercely, the legislature may find ways to improve PAGA to 
prevent its eradication.   
c. Effect on Employers and Employees 
California would revert to its pre-2004 labor enforcement mecha-
nism, in which the Attorney General—and not the deputized plaintiff—
would retain the sole power to enforce the labor code.  Consequently, 
there would likely be a reversion to pre-PAGA enforcement.  Unless the 
legislature affords the LWDA a substantial budget proposal to increase 
staffing levels, the LWDA would likely continue having problems effec-
tively enforcing the labor code.  California would no longer be able to 
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collect on PAGA penalties.  Although critics of PAGA argue the state’s 
revenue from PAGA claims is disproportionate to that of the PAGA 
plaintiff, the state still profits from successful PAGA suits.203   
Moreover, as enforcement mechanisms wane, the amount of enti-
ties functioning without tax and licensing requirements would likely in-
crease.  Such a ruling would be a blow not only to the state, but also to 
the aggrieved employee, who would likely find it more difficult to raise 
a grievance against an employer due to the loss of enforcement available 
under PAGA.   
The best-case scenario for employers would be the court’s finding 
PAGA unconstitutional.  Employers would be less vulnerable to lawsuits 
from aggrieved employees asserting labor code violations on behalf of 
co-workers and former employees.  Further, releasing employers from 
bearing additional litigation expenses would afford them more time to 
focus on productivity and would decrease the cost of doing business in 
California.  Courts would also breathe a sigh of relief as the strain on 
their dockets would likely decrease, thus furthering judicial economy.204   
2. If CABIA is Unsuccessful on Constitutionality Challenge 
A ruling in favor of the Attorney General would maintain the status-
quo.  If the court reaffirms PAGA’s validity under its most determinative 
attack thus far, it would leave employers with little hope to eradicate the 
law.  The trend of PAGA’s expansion in scope would likely continue for 
years to come, and aggrieved employees, the PAGA plaintiff, and the 
state would continue bearing benefits associated with generous PAGA 
penalties and hefty payouts.   
Regardless of the prevailing party, an appeal is likely inevitable, 
and the case may very well reach the California Supreme Court.   
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Option 1: Settlement Proposal Review Hearing 
If PAGA survives CABIA, then, to remain loyal to its legislative 
purpose, the legislature should implement more stringent requirements 
for courts reviewing settlement agreements involving PAGA claims.  
For example, when a judge is presented with a settlement agreement in-
cluding a PAGA claim, the court could require a settlement proposal re-
view hearing.   
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At these settlement proposal review hearings, courts should be 
bound by a uniform standard of review.  Courts, for example, could make 
their own standard by borrowing, or building on, settlement standards 
used in preliminary approval hearings in class actions.   
For example, a court reviewing a proposed class action settlement 
at the preliminary approval hearing phase determines whether it is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” to the class members.205  The judge also con-
siders any indications of wrongdoing to ensure the settlement does not 
just benefit the lead plaintiff and counsel.206  A court handling a proposed 
settlement agreement involving a PAGA claim could use a similar stand-
ard to promote principles of fairness and reasonableness.   
Further, these hearings would afford the judge an opportunity to 
question both parties regarding the settlement agreement, and if there is 
more money being allocated to individual claims versus the PAGA 
claim, the judge can request an explanation as to why the PAGA claim 
is minimized.  If the parties fail to provide a compelling reason, the judge 
could reject the settlement agreement under the rationale that the stipu-
lation does not represent the best interest of the general public—the in-
tended beneficiary of the PAGA law.   
By mandating such a requirement, the legislature would place itself 
in a position to receive more of the money settlement agreements involv-
ing PAGA claims resolve. This solution could lead to increased LWDA 
funding, which would in the long term, diminish or eliminate altogether, 
its reliance on PAGA.  Further, such requirements would level the cur-
rent existing imbalance that commonly allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to sti-
fle employers and the state from their own money. 
B. Option 2: Repeal PAGA 
Another solution is for the California legislature to repeal PAGA.  
Over the years, both the California judiciary and legislative bodies have 
defended PAGA, allowing the law to evolve into its present-day mecha-
nism.  The aggrieved employee is carrying out the responsibilities of the 
Attorney General, meanwhile the state idly sits by, waiting to collect 
civil penalties awarded at the end of litigation.   
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In a pre-PAGA California when the state lacked resources to en-
force the labor code, PAGA was a solution that divested the responsibil-
ities of the Attorney General to the general public and one that surely 
seemed appealing.  Through PAGA, the state created an escape hatch by 
which it obtained the resources to implement the labor code it so longed, 
without having to actually obtain more funds from the state for the 
LWDA.   
PAGA has proven to be an expensive escape hatch thus far for em-
ployers.  If eradicated, California would revert to pre-PAGA days, which 
would allow the state to handle this situation with the knowledge and 
experience gained over the course of PAGA’s existence.  The state 
would have to allocate more funds and resources to the LWDA and itself 
implement the labor code.   
Critics of this position would likely argue it would be absurd to re-
turn to a pre-PAGA period of time because the law has been effective in 
fulfilling its intended purpose of increased labor code enforcement.  
PAGA, however, has also proven to be an extortive tool by the PAGA 
plaintiff, which allows it to capitalize on violations that prove to be an 
expensive litigation strain on employers and do little to benefit the gen-
eral public.207  Moreover, although the state collects millions of dollars 
in PAGA suits, these suits often also deprive California of money, be-
cause often only a small settlement amount is allocated to the PAGA 
suit, while the PAGA plaintiff retains the majority.  Of course, without 
PAGA, the state would be unable to collect on PAGA claims, but the 
state would alternatively be in a position to receive the full amount of a 
labor code violation and would not have to split judgments with an ag-
grieved plaintiff.   
C. Option 3: Employer/Employee Led Solutions 
1. Employer Solutions 
In light of the positive treatment courts have afforded PAGA cases 
and the law’s expansion since its inception, employers are best off im-
plementing preventative measures that will limit vulnerability to a 
PAGA lawsuit.   
Employers can, for example, work with their internal Human Re-
sources departments, or respective personnel handling workplace poli-
cies, to conduct thorough investigations intended to uncover circum-
stances not complying with the labor code.  Labor code language can be 
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difficult to understand to ensure employees receive proper meal breaks 
and rest periods. 
The ambiguity and technical language in the labor code adds to the 
complexity of achieving compliance—many employers believe they are 
complying, when in fact, technical violations expose them to devastating 
penalties.208  Because of this, it is important for employers to be prudent 
in ensuring compliance, and should consider attending educational sem-
inars provided by state agencies.209  These seminars are free of charge 
and often cover a wide range of topics, such as: State Labor Law and 
Payroll Tax, and Employee/ Independent Contractor classification.210   
In addition, employers can seek assistance from the California Em-
ployer Advisory Council (“CEAC”).211 The CEAC is a nonprofit, 
statewide organization, with various locations throughout the state that 
provides information and resources on employment and workforce de-
velopment issues.212  Regional offices hold compliance-related seminars 
frequently, and can help employers stay current with developments in 
the labor code.213   
Employers should also implement systems to ensure persons within 
their management structure are properly informed of all mandatory per-
sonnel policies.  Management personnel should work diligently to un-
derstand the labor code provisions relevant to their industry and should 
ensure practices reflect compliance.   
Employers should keep and maintain proper employee records.  
Such records should detail work hours, rest and meal periods, overtime 
hours worked, etc.  It is important to maintain these records, as the em-
ployer often bears the burden of keeping detailed work-records in litiga-
tion.  Through this practice, employers will be able to hold themselves 
accountable if employees are not receiving adequate breaks.  Conse-
quently, employers could take immediate measures to remedy any vio-
lations before they escalate into a PAGA lawsuit.  If a PAGA action is 
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raised, however, employers would have security in knowing all em-
ployee timesheet and payroll records were properly tracked and would 
be able to refute any allegations of noncompliance with these records as 
evidence.   
2. Employee Solutions 
Alternatively, employees should ensure their employers are com-
plying with the labor code and take proper action if an employer is not.  
The DIR has “Know Your Rights” resources available on its website that 
educate workers on workplace issues, such as retaliation, unpaid wages 
and other labor violations.214  An employee can also contact an attorney 
or visit a local Labor Commissioner’s office for further assistance.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
PAGA was enacted in 2004 to allow plaintiffs to help the under-
funded LWDA enforce the labor code.  In its current manifestation, the 
law operates as a costly tool against California employers and the legis-
lative purpose has been undermined as PAGA claims are often settled 
for the benefit of the PAGA plaintiff and at the expense of the state.   
In 2020 and perhaps beyond, PAGA will confront its most threat-
ening challenge to date in CABIA v. Xavier Becerra.  Regardless of the 
outcome at the trial court level, observers and the business community 
can expect an appeal.  As the alleged causes of action raise important 
constitutional challenges, the case may reach the California Supreme 
Court.  If PAGA were to survive CABIA, the hope that PAGA could one 
day disappear would appear unattainable.   
Considering the record of favorable judicial and legislative treat-
ment, California courts and the legislature resort to any means necessary 
to accommodate the law.  In light of tight budgetary constraints, the 
LWDA relies on PAGA plaintiffs to help enforce the labor code.  
PAGA’s expansion is seen through decisions such as Arias, Iskanian, 
and Huff.   
From an economic perspective, California collects a substantial 
sum of money from PAGA actions.  However, courts can mandate set-
tlement proposal review hearings, which would shift more of the PAGA 
penalties from the aggrieved plaintiff to the state and the LWDA.  In the 
long term, the state would no longer need to rely on PAGA to enforce 
the labor code.  Without PAGA, the LWDA could itself pursue all labor 
code violations and collect the full amount of available penalties.   
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However, if CABIA’s constitutionality attack is successful, the Cal-
ifornia Legislature would have an enormous task of ensuring proper en-
forcement of the labor code, in hopes of avoiding the pre-2004 enforce-
ment reality that led to PAGA’s enactment.   
In the meantime, to avoid a PAGA suit, employers should work in-
ternally to ensure compliance with the labor code.  Employees with 
workplace issues, on the other hand, should contact an attorney or their 
local Labor Commissioner’s office.   
PAGA is undeniably a source of dispute—one that places the busi-
ness owner and the employee at odds with one another.  It is apparent 
PAGA will continue to be a source of dispute.  If the judiciary continues 
expanding its scope, the legislature ought to implement the safeguard of 
settlement reviews to help the law achieve the purpose which motivated 
its enactment.   
 
